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  The laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit mar-
kets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical 
models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market 
and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design 
issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regula-
tory enforcement. 
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Emissions trading has grown significantly in im-
portance in the regulatory toolkit over the past 
few decades. The flexibility allowed by this ap-
proach, which is often referred to as cap-and-
trade, is estimated to have saved billions of dol-
lars as a key component of efforts in the United 
States to cut sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions in 
half during the 1990s. Emissions trading is now 
the centerpiece of many serious efforts worldwide 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions 
permits convey rights that can be exchanged be-
tween firms, subject to some constraints and rules 
chosen by the regulator, and these trades lower 
the overall cost of meeting an environmental goal 
by equalizing the marginal abatement costs across 
sources (Montgomery 1972). But what market 
rules and constraints are necessary, and which 
harm the performance of the emissions trading 
system? Should the regulator rely on trading in-
stitutions to emerge naturally, even if this results 
in relatively decentralized markets with high trans-
action costs, or instead take steps to encourage or 
even sponsor centralized trading institutions? The 
principle of emissions trading is elegant and sim-
ple, but market performance can depend on many 
design factors. The devil is in the details. Fortu-
nately, laboratory experiments can create real, 
simplified, and controlled markets to help answer 
important questions like these. 
  The laboratory is useful because all markets are 
influenced by similar economic forces. Labora-
tory markets are populated by profit-motivated 
human agents, just as markets in the field are, and 
with induced incentives and other controls they 
are actual market microeconomic systems (Smith 
1982). Different forces are stronger and more 
complex in different situations, of course, but 
they can be isolated and studied with careful ex-
perimental designs. Few economists would dis-
pute that theoretical models are useful for pro-
viding insight into the factors that influence how 
markets perform. A theoretical model is a simpli-
fied abstraction constructed to help the researcher 
understand some real-world phenomenon. It is 
not intended to mirror every detail. An experi-
ment is also a simplified construction, and it is 
often closely guided by a theoretical model. But 
the experiment is typically closer to the “real 
world” field than the theory is, because it includes 
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human decision makers who may be boundedly 
rational or have nonstandard preferences that in-
fluence market outcomes in important ways. Ex-
periments can thus serve as a bridge between the-
ory and the field markets where our interest ulti-
mately lies, since they indicate whether and how 
predictions developed through theoretical rea-
soning can be applied to more complex field con-
ditions. 
  This article reviews some laboratory experi-
ments that have been used to inform specific as-
pects of emissions permit design. One approach 
has been to develop theoretical models of the 
relevant market institutions and rules, and then 
evaluate the predictive value of these theoretical 
models using experiments that are constructed on 
the domain of the theories. The next section pre-
sents some examples of this approach. Sometimes 
theory provides less direct guidance, but the ex-
periments can still provide a useful “test bed” to 
evaluate the researchers’ or regulators’ intuitions 
even when they are not modeled formally. The 
experiment itself is the model of the emissions 
trading system, and the impact of different design 
features can be investigated within the experi-
mental model (Bardsley et al. 2009, Ch. 4). This 
article also presents some examples of this type. 
In all cases the point of these experiments is to 
evaluate specific features of the market or emis-
sions property rights, and not a wide variety of 
design features simultaneously. The control of the 
lab is especially useful for answering particular 
design questions. The conclusion highlights some 
unanswered research questions, and discusses 
methodological extensions to further improve 
external validity of these types of experiments. 
 
Theoretical Models and Emissions 
Experiments 
 
In some cases the regulator has already chosen or 
even implemented some design features of an 
emissions trading system when an experiment is 
conducted to evaluate the implications of those 
features. This first example is based on the earli-
est emission permit auctions, which were for SO2 
allowances and started in 1993. The U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) followed 
guidance in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 (“the Act”) in implementing a new auction 
institution with some unusual incentive proper-
ties. This institution could be modeled theoreti-
cally under some simplifying assumptions. Al-
though alternative, uniform price auction rules 
could be implemented without any additional 
regulatory burden, the EPA’s initial interpretation 
of the Act was that the unusual rules were re-
quired. Therefore, the EPA did not consider run-
ning a field or lab experiment to determine whether 
the uniform price institution could perform better. 
The laboratory, however, can provide exactly this 
comparison under controlled conditions. 
  The Act stated that “allowances shall be sold 
on the basis of bid price, starting with the high-
est-priced bid and continuing until all allowances 
for sale at such auction have been allocated” (em-
phasis added).
1 The EPA interpreted this as 
implying a discriminative price auction, with 
winning buyers paying their own bid prices. Such 
discriminative (or “pay-as-bid”) pricing rules are 
not unusual. The unusual feature of this auction is 
that individual sellers receive the bid prices of 
“matched” buyers, with higher priority and thus 
higher bid prices given to sellers who offered 
lower prices. The Act also required the EPA to 
offer a reserve onto this central auction of about 
2.8 percent of the total allowances available, at an 
asking price of zero, to ensure that the auction 
provided some early price signals to this new 
market. The vertical arrows in Figure 1 illustrate 
how specific bids are transferred to specific sell-
ers, as well as the priority of the EPA reserve 
allowances. 
  Cason (1993) showed that the bid-to-offer 
matching scheme of this new EPA auction creates 
incentives for all buyers and sellers to submit of-
fers below their marginal cost of emissions abate-
ment. Consequently, it can generate downwardly 
biased price signals—counter to Congress’s goal 
to provide accurate price signals for this emerging 
market. By contrast, specialists on the New York 
Stock Exchange set the daily opening price for 
securities using a uniform price call auction, and 
such uniform price rules for sealed bid-offer auc-
tions are common worldwide for securities that 
have low trading volume. Figure 1 illustrates this 
uniform price with a horizontal dashed arrow. 
Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) 
showed that precisely because only the marginal  
                                                                                    
1 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Public Law 101-549), Sec. 





Figure 1. Example Offers and Bids to Illustrate the EPA Auction Rules 
 
 
traders affect price under uniform price auction 
rules, both buyers and sellers in this trading insti-
tution have an incentive to almost fully reveal 
their true valuations (here, their marginal abate-
ment costs) in their bids and asks. This truthful 
revelation allows the market to realize nearly all 
available gains from exchange, and provides more 
accurate price signals. 
  Cason (1995) confirmed that human subjects 
could recognize and bid according to the theoreti-
cal incentives of the EPA auction rules in an ini-
tial experiment that included only the seller side 
of the market and varied the number of traders. 
Cason and Plott (1996) included both buyers and 
sellers in their experiment, and also compared 
behavior and performance of the EPA auction to 
the more standard uniform-price auction rules. 
Sellers in these EPA auctions quickly recognized 
that they could obtain higher prices by offering 
permits well below cost, and the overall level of 
value and cost misrepresentation in the trader bids 
and offers far exceeded levels seen in other auc-
tion institutions. In the experiment the EPA auc-
tion rules generate lower market-clearing prices 
and extract fewer gains from exchange than the 
uniform price auction rules. The EPA auction 
also responds more slowly to changes in under-
lying market conditions. Compared to the uni-
form-price auction, prices in the EPA auction are 
less accurate reflections of underlying marginal 
abatement costs, and they therefore provide infe-
rior signals for firms considering investments in 
emissions control. 
  Besides having poor incentive properties, the 
EPA auction is also risky for potential permit 
sellers. Sellers have the incentive to submit offers 
below cost, and if they are matched with low-bid-
ding buyers they could potentially receive pay-
ments that fail to cover their cost. (This some-
times occurred in the experiments.) The auction 
also does not allow buyers to purchase a multi-
year stream of permits to cover anticipated emis-
sions for an investment such as a new or ex-
panded power plant. These factors led to the vir-
tual abandonment of the EPA auction by sellers 
(Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998).
2 Other 
than the reserve allowances that the Act forces 
onto the auction, virtually no permits were sold in 
auctions held between 2003 and 2009.
3 
                                                                                    
2 Multi-year streams of permits could be included, however, in a 
centralized and low transaction cost market using a combinatorial auc-
tion (Porter et al. 2009).  
3 See http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/auction.html (accessed 
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  Based in part on evidence provided by these 
experiments, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
recommended a switch to more standard uniform-
price rules (GAO 1994). The EPA determined 
that the statutory language of the Act permitted it 
to switch to a uniform-price rule, and solicited 
comments to a proposal to make that change be-
cause this “may have the benefit of producing a 
less confusing price signal….”
4 Ultimately, how-
ever, EPA decided to retain the existing rules. 
Most trades now occur through brokers (with 
high transaction costs) and not through a cen-
tralized exchange. Nevertheless, the SO2 program 
is generally regarded as a success, and as a model 
for other emissions trading programs (Ellerman et 
al. 2000). Fortunately, no other programs have 
adopted its unusual auction rules. 
  This is just one example of an emissions trad-
ing experiment that is strongly motivated by and 
designed around specific theoretical models and 
predictions. Another example is reported in Mur-
phy and Stranlund (2007), who use an experiment 
to study compliance behavior in an emissions 
market with imperfect enforcement. Stranlund 
and Dhanda (1999) showed that compliance deci-
sions in emissions trading programs are inde-
pendent of any firm-level characteristics, since 
each firm faces the same marginal cost of compli-
ance: the prevailing permit price. This implies 
that enforcement targeted towards specific firms, 
which is theoretically justified in command-and-
control regulation, is theoretically misguided in 
emissions trading systems. 
  To test this important policy implication, Mur-
phy and Stranlund (2007) studied compliance 
decisions by laboratory subjects who faced prob-
abilistic inspections and fines for violating re-
porting rules. In one “regulatory” treatment they 
faced uniform emissions standards where en-
forcement targeting is justified, and in another 
treatment the subjects traded permits and it was 
not justified. Consistent with theory, violations 
were independent of subject characteristics only 
when they could trade permits. Nevertheless, 
those traders who had low permit endowments 
and thus were permit buyers in equilibrium 
tended to have higher violation rates. Overall, this 
                                                                                    
4 Federal Register, Environmental Protection Agency (40 CFR), Part 
73, “Acid Rain Program, SO2 Allowance Auction and Electronic 
Allowance Transfer; Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” pp. 
28995–28998 (June 6, 1996). 
experiment provides direct empirical evidence that 
enforcement targeting has limited value in emis-
sions trading schemes because the flexibility pro-
vided by trading equalizes marginal compliance 
costs. Laboratory evidence like this can some-
times be more convincing to regulators than purely 
theoretical arguments. 
 
Experimental Models and Emissions 
Experiments 
 
Theoretical modeling is more prominent in eco-
nomics than in many other social sciences. Em-
pirical research in economics often begins with 
formal hypotheses derived within the structure of 
a theoretical model. The empiricist then tests 
these hypotheses with naturally occurring or ex-
perimental data. While this approach has its 
strengths, experimental models are also useful for 
providing insight into complex new design prob-
lems such as those faced by regulators imple-
menting emissions trading systems. The idea is to 
create experimental designs to capture key as-
pects of the real-world market, and then vary 
features of the market to investigate how this af-
fects outcomes (Bardsley et al. 2009, Ch. 4). 
  Experimental models are useful for institutional 
design in part because purely theoretical model-
ing is constrained by the theorist’s imagination 
(Smith 2008). An experiment with human sub-
jects leaves room for other, unimagined factors to 
influence outcomes. It can also serve as a test bed 
to try out new rules and institutions, even those 
guided not by specific theoretical predictions, but 
rather by the designer’s intuitions. Importantly, 
experiments provide a very low-cost way to iden-
tify weaknesses and strengths of alternative de-
sign features. 
  Consider, for example, the banking or expira-
tion date rules for emissions permits. For some 
environmental problems, most prominently green-
house gas emissions, atmospheric concentrations 
are largely cumulative and so the timing of emis-
sions is immaterial. Future emissions are never 
worse than current emissions of the same amount. 
The timing of emissions is important and must be 
regulated for other environmental problems, such 
as ground-level ozone, nitrogen and sulfur oxide 
(NOX and SOX) emissions, and many waterway 
discharges. One way to ensure that emissions oc-
cur only in a specific time period is to limit when Cason  What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?   155 
 
 
emissions permits can cover releases. Unfortu-
nately, this can lead to considerable price vola-
tility in a permit market, especially when actual 
emissions are uncertain and are correlated across 
sources. Emissions correlation can arise for a va-
riety of reasons, such as weather (e.g., an unusu-
ally hot or cold season spread over a large geo-
graphic area) or macroeconomic factors (e.g., the 
business cycle, or exchange rate fluctuations 
affecting the competitiveness of imports and 
exports). 
  Carlson et al. (1993) illustrated the potential 
volatility of emission permit prices due to emis-
sions correlation in a pair of experimental ses-
sions that were instrumental in leading the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District to adopt 
innovative rules for permit expiration in the 
RECLAIM NOX and SOX emissions permit sys-
tem in Southern California. All permits had the 
same annual expiration date in the original pro-
posed plan. Carlson et al.’s experiment showed 
that this rule led to dramatic price spikes in peri-
ods with positive shocks in emissions, as traders 
competed to obtain scarce permits in order to 
maintain compliance. Conversely, following nega-
tive emissions shocks, prices crashed to near zero 
as traders dumped unneeded permits on the market. 
  To avoid this problem the researchers proposed 
and tested a system with overlapping expiration 
dates of annual permits. All permits could be re-
deemed to cover emissions over a 12-month in-
terval, but some permits expired on December 31 
and some expired on June 30. Emissions at any 
point in time could thus be covered by two differ-
ent types of permits. The researchers conducted 
an experimental session with these rules, with 
traders facing the same pattern of positive and 
negative correlated emissions shocks that led to 
price spikes and crashes with the regulator’s 
original plan for a common expiration date. Per-
mit prices were substantially less volatile in this 
session, since the substitutability of the two alter-
native permit types allowed the market to buffer 
and smooth out the emissions shocks. No formal 
theoretical modeling was necessary, and the ex-
perimental demonstration of this simple intuition 
was sufficient to convince the regulator to adopt 
the proposal for overlapping expiration dates. 
  Allowing unused permits to be banked for fu-
ture use is another way to smooth out price varia-
tion that can arise from uncertain and correlated 
emissions. If emissions are lower than expected, 
unused permits can be banked and do not need to 
be dumped on the market before the end of the 
compliance period. The banked permits also pro-
vide a reserve that can be drawn down when 
emissions are higher than anticipated, avoiding 
price spikes. Cason and Gangadharan (2006) im-
plemented emissions shocks by adding or sub-
tracting an independent shock to each trader’s 
chosen emissions target. The shocks were corre-
lated in some sessions by making all shocks either 
nonnegative or nonpositive in certain periods. 
The experiment included permit markets con-
ducted in the exact same underlying environment, 
except that banking was allowed in some sessions 
and not allowed in others. 
  Figure 2 illustrates the difference in price vola-
tility for two sessions with correlated emissions 
shocks. The two panels display the time series of 
individual permit transaction prices for a se-
quence of compliance periods (differentiated by 
the vertical lines), as well as the median transac-
tion price for each period connected with the 
thick solid line. The top panel highlights some 
periods in which large negative or positive aggre-
gate shocks led to substantial transaction price 
swings. Notice that the very low or high prices 
occur towards the end of the trading periods (i.e., 
just before the vertical period break line). These 
trades occur after the emissions shocks are re-
ported to the traders, and the excess supply or 
demand of permits causes prices to drop by as 
much as 90 percent or rise by up to 50 percent.
5 
By contrast, the lower panel features permit bank-
ing, and even though the same underlying sto-
chastic process generated correlated emission 
shocks, the price volatility is significantly lower. 
  The lower panel, however, also illustrates a 
negative consequence of banking. In this experi-
ment traders reported their emissions voluntarily, 
and they faced probabilistic inspection and finan-
cial penalties for misreporting. As emissions trad-
ing systems expand beyond cases like SO2 emis-
sions that can be monitored electronically and 
continuously, imperfect enforcement can lead to 
                                                                                    
5 Price crashes can also arise when permits are overallocated and no 
banking is allowed. A dramatic example occurred in the field at the end 
of Phase I (2007) in the European Union’s greenhouse gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Permits were generously allocated by many EU mem-
ber countries, and they were not bankable for use in Phase II. When 
market participants recognized this overallocation, permit prices col-
lapsed to near zero. This price crash would not have occurred if per-
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Figure 2. Impact of Allowing Permit Banking When Emission Shocks Are Correlated Across 
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various types of noncompliance. For the permit 
supply and marginal abatement costs in the envi-
ronment underlying Figure 2 (not shown), equi-
librium prices under full compliance are in the 
range [88, 91]. Noncompliance causes the effec-
tive supply of permits to increase and lowers 
transaction prices. This noncompliance is a proxi-
mate cause of the progressively lower prices ob-
served in the lower panel of Figure 2.
6 
  Banking increases the incentive to underreport 
emissions because lower reported emissions al-
low the firm to carry over “unused” permits. 
These permits have a financial value when bank-
ing is allowed because they can be used or sold in 
subsequent periods. Cason and Gangadharan 
(2006) found that banking significantly increased 
noncompliance, while also reducing price volatil-
ity. Price stability is important to equalize mar-
ginal abatement costs across firms and provide 
clear incentives for R&D into new emission con-
trol technologies, but regulatory compliance is 
also obviously important. The regulator faces a 
trade-off when deciding whether to allow bank-
ing, and if enforcement is weak (perhaps due to 
statutory limits on fines) then banking limitations 
may be warranted, even though this comes at the 
cost of some price volatility. 
  Stranlund, Costello, and Chavez (2005) mod-
eled the relationship between banking and com-
pliance, drawing a distinction between permit 
violations (i.e., failing to hold sufficient permits 
to offset emissions) and reporting violations (i.e., 
misrepresenting actual emission levels to the regu-
lator). Consistent with theory, Stranlund, Murphy, 
and Spraggon (2009) provide some preliminary 
experimental evidence that high compliance rates 
are possible with a low permit violation penalty 
provided that reporting violations are penalized 
more strongly. 
  Although enforcement policies have a direct 
influence on compliance incentives, these incen-
tives are also influenced by the liability rules that 
apply when noncompliance can lead to permit 
“default.” If party A sells permits to party B, then 
A is responsible for limiting her emissions to 
comply with a smaller number of permits. If both 
                                                                                    
6 Weaker enforcement has a direct negative effect on compliance 
incentives because of its lower likelihood of penalties. Murphy and 
Stranlund (2006) highlight that weaker enforcement makes compliance 
less expensive, however, since it leads to lower transaction prices, and 
this generates a positive indirect effect on compliance. 
trading parties are subject to the same regulatory 
authority, then the regulator can view the pur-
chased permits by B as valid and simply penalize 
A if she fails to limit her emissions. The matter is 
more complicated, however, if A and B are sub-
ject to different regulatory authorities and their 
interaction is not overseen by a strong system of 
legal enforcement. Key examples include the in-
ternational trading of emission permits, or emis-
sion offsets that are traded through systems such 
as the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mecha-
nism. In these cases the parties may be regulated 
in different countries, and legal commitments are 
difficult to enforce without ongoing international 
cooperation. Sanctioning authority is usually not 
granted in treaties. In this case if A fails to limit 
emissions sufficiently, a seller liability rule may 
not be available to penalize A to ensure that the 
buyer B holds valid permits and is in compliance. 
  Cason (2003) studied the effectiveness of an 
alternative buyer liability rule in promoting com-
pliance in these circumstances. Traders set emis-
sion reduction targets, but they had to make 
costly investments to increase the likelihood that 
their targets were met. In one treatment their “re-
liability investments” were unobservable, and in 
another treatment they could have these invest-
ments inspected and revealed to potential buyers 
in the market. Similar to bonds that have a higher 
default risk trading at a price discount, permits 
that were sold with unknown reliability traded at 
a discount to reflect their greater default risk. This 
price discount apparently motivated sellers to 
invite inspection of their reliability investments, 
and consequently overall efficiency was greater 
in the treatment with the inspection option. 
  Godby and Shogren (2008) compared buyer 
liability and seller liability rules in a different 
experimental environment, but without the op-
portunity for permit sellers to invite inspections 
of their reliability investments. They did, how-
ever, include conditions that allowed sellers to 
acquire good reputations through market interac-
tions that repeated with an unknown endpoint. In 
contrast to the main result in Cason (2003), buyer 
liability performed poorly and led to widespread 
market failure. Prices and trading volume were 
much lower with buyer liability than with seller 
liability rules. This is similar to what occurred in 
the treatment in Cason (2003) with buyer liability 
when reliability investments could not be in-
spected. This suggests that the difference in buyer 158    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
liability performance could be due to the avail-
ability of credible reliability inspections. Thus, a 
tentative conclusion that could be drawn across 
these independent studies is that when seller li-
ability is problematic due to limits on interna-
tional sanctioning, authorities should promote the 
development of objective and credible interna-
tional certification of projects intended to reduce 
emissions. 
  Experimental models are obviously simplifica-
tions, but they include the factors that the experi-
menter believes are relevant to the market design 
or research question. The experiments focus on 
capturing the underlying market incentives, and 
the words to describe the items being traded are 
not considered in standard economic models to be 
part of those incentives. Consequently, all of the 
experiments summarized to this point used neu-
tral framing to describe the laboratory markets. 
Pollution, emissions trading, and the environment 
were never mentioned. For example, subjects of-
ten traded abstract “coupons” and had to “choose 
a number” (the number choice corresponded to 
the level of emissions abatement). 
  This neutral framing is common for laboratory 
experiments across most subfields in economics, 
and it is often justified by the experimenter’s de-
sire to obscure the experiment’s context and pur-
pose from subjects. The goal is to increase ex-
perimental control by limiting subjects’ ability to 
invoke mental scripts.
7 Advocates of field experi-
ments, however, sometimes argue that neutral 
framing can reduce control if it leads subjects to 
invent their own context for an abstract, neutrally 
framed experimental task. The subjects’ personal 
context is, in this case, unobserved by the experi-
menter (Harrison and List 2004). Whether the use 
of a neutral context affects behavior and market 
outcomes is, of course, an empirical question that 
is perfectly suited for experimental investigation. 
  Raymond and Cason (2009) manipulate fram-
ing as a treatment variable in an emissions trading 
experiment in order to assess the strength of af-
firmative motivations on compliance, such as the 
personal sense of a law’s legitimacy or morality. 
This contrasts with the negative motivations—
fear of costly punishments for violations—that is 
                                                                                    
7 See Alm (1999) for a discussion of these issues for laboratory ex-
periments on tax compliance. 
the foundation of economics research on compli-
ance. The experiment also varied these motiva-
tions by changing the enforcement strength: emis-
sions were audited with a 25 percent probability 
in the low enforcement treatment, and with a 50 
percent probability in the high enforcement treat-
ment. In the environmentally framed treatment, 
subjects were told to imagine themselves as man-
agers of a fossil fuel burning electricity plant who 
could buy permits to legally emit pollution or 
incur pollution abatement costs to reduce emis-
sions. We expected that this environmental fram-
ing would prime affirmative motivations relative 
to traditional neutral framing. We also assessed 
subjects’ compliance, environmental, and emis-
sions trading attitudes through pre- and post-ex-
periment surveys. 
  Figure 3 shows that both the level of enforce-
ment and the environmental framing significantly 
affected compliance rates. (Here, compliance is 
measured by the percentage of subjects’ reports 
that accurately describe to the regulator the level 
of emissions for the period.) While increased en-
forcement leads predictably to more compliance, 
the environmental framing led to less compliance 
than neutral framing. This unexpected finding is 
robust across enforcement levels and other factors 
such as equal versus unequal initial permit en-
dowments that were also manipulated in this ex-
periment. At least in the context of the experi-
mental model, changing the framing had as large 
an impact on compliance as doubling the random 
monitoring rate from 25 to 50 percent. This 
should be troubling to experimental economists 
who often believe that framing effects are minor, 
at least for market experiments. This belief is of-
ten based on faith, rather than facts derived from 
controlled experimentation. These new results 






The examples reviewed here illustrate how ex-
periments can evaluate the performance of spe-
cific trading institutions, such as new auction 
institutions implemented specifically for emis-
sions trading, and how permit banking affects 








trolled perfectly. They can also identify condi-
tions in which different types of liability rules can 
improve the information provided through market 
prices, so that efficient international trading can 
occur even without a strong legal framework for 
addressing permit defaults. 
  This review is necessarily selective, and scores 
of other articles and book volumes report addi-
tional examples of applied permit market design 
research using laboratory experiments (e.g., Isaac 
and Holt 1999, Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2008). 
Nevertheless, many important research questions 
remain unaddressed. Some are inspired by current 
debates in the United States and Europe regarding 
permit allocation methods, even though the allo-
cation is generally considered by economists as 
merely a distributional, political issue. As of this 
writing, it appears that in a possible tradable per-
mit system in the United States for greenhouse 
gas emissions, initially most (80+ percent) per-
mits will be grandfathered to existing emitters 
with only a small fraction auctioned. These grand-
fathered permits will trade in an aftermarket 
along with auctioned permits, and experiments 
can determine how this interaction affects the 
speed and accuracy of price discovery in both the 
primary auction and secondary aftermarket. 
Economists are also skeptical of political claims 
that grandfathered permits will lower the burden 
of increased costs downstream for final consum-
ers of energy. Even though grandfathered permits 
are received without an explicit cost, they are a 
tradable asset with an opportunity cost.
8 Experi-
ments can test the theoretical prediction that 
downstream prices rise by the same amount re-
gardless of whether permits are grandfathered or 
auctioned. 
  Although laboratory experiments are useful for 
providing some initial answers to questions about 
permit market design, they are only one tool. 
Field experiments of various kinds are also neces-
sary, and existing research suggests that such ex-
periments could provide qualitatively different 
insights. Most emissions trading experiments em-
ploy student subjects and a neutral, non-environ-
mental context, although a few exceptions exist 
(e.g., Bohm and Carlén 1999). As noted above, 
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is included in the rate base. 160    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
framing effects appear to be large even for stu-
dent subjects, and previous research has found 
that context framing is most useful for expert 
subjects participating in field experiments, since 
the context allows them to draw on past experi-
ence (Cooper et al. 1999, Alatas et al. 2009). It is 
important to extend permit market experiments to 
include environmental managers and other deci-
sion makers in affected industries as subjects, 
such as in Poe, Suter, and Vossler (2009), par-
ticularly for research investigating non-economic 
incentives for compliance with emissions trading 
rules and regulations. 
  As more emissions trading programs are imple-
mented in the field, researchers will use data from 
these field markets, and conclusions drawn from 
these data can be compared to parallel data from 
designed field and laboratory experiments. Natu-
rally occurring data from the field and data from 
experiments are complements, not substitutes. 
Even if emissions markets become widespread, 
however, an important role will still exist for ex-
periments to provide a low-cost test bed to ini-
tially evaluate alternative market designs and 
rules. Besides using professional subjects more 
often, additional innovations can improve the 
external validity of such experiments. These in-
clude incorporating additional realistic institu-
tional details, such as the political processes lead-
ing to permit allocations and market rules. Future 
experiments can also add real environmental con-
sequences, such as actual emission increases that 
depend on subjects’ decisions in the experiment. 
This would be particularly useful to study social 
motivations for market participants’ compliance 
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